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Abstract Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behav-
ior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often 
overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents 
are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-
maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people 
choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reit-
erate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare cri-
terion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken 
becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the 
possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution 
has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare 
criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government 
wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint 
for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in prin-
ciple justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be 
arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without 
turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an inde-
pendent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behav-
ioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible exam-
ples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such 
as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be 
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effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset 
clauses.
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1  Introduction: the behavioral revolution and its unsolved issues
Whereas the economic approach to law has probably been the most powerful intel-
lectual movement affecting law and policy-making in the twentieth century, the 
beginning of the twenty-first century seems to be marked by cognitive and social 
psychology. Researchers such as Tversky and Kahneman showed that many indi-
viduals are subject to a variety of cognitive heuristics and biases as a result of which 
they may not always maximize their expected utility.1 Given that the direction of 
the aforementioned deviations from the rational (in an economic sense) behavior is 
often predictable, scholars have been able to produce models of decision making 
that include these behavioral anomalies.2
These insights from cognitive psychology have to a large extent been incorporated 
into the traditional economic analysis of law through the seminal work of Sunstein 
and Jolls,3 leading to a new domain referred to as “behavioral law and economics.” 
The goal of behavioral law and economics “is to offer better predictions and pre-
scriptions about law based on improved accounts of how people actually behave.”4 
Although there was originally some opposition to this behavioral approach,5 leading 
law and economics scholars now largely recognize the importance of cognitive psy-
chology also for the domain of law and economics.6 More recently, governments and 
policy-makers have become interested in the implementation of the insights coming 
from behavioral sciences into the rule-making process. Indeed, the recently estab-
lished area of behavioral policy-making7 aims to enhance policies that counteract 
1 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman et al. (1982).
2 Ariely and Jones (2008) and Camerer and Loewenstein (2004).
3 See inter alia Jolls (1998), Jolls et al. (1998), Sunstein (1997, 1999, 2000).
4 Jolls (1998, 1654).
5 See more particularly Posner (1998).
6 Richard Epstein, for example, held: “There is little doubt that the major new theoretical approach to 
law and economics in the past two decades does not come from either field, but from the adjacent disci-
pline of cognitive psychology, which has now moved into behavioral economics” (Epstein 2008).
7 From the outset, we should formulate one warning as far as the terminology is concerned. There is, 
on the one hand, a broad discussion on using insights of behavioral economics at the policy level. This 
is generally referred to as “behavioral policy-making.” However, after the publication in 2008 of Thaler 
and Sunstein’s famous book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness, the 
term “Nudging” had gained increasing popularity. Nudging interventions act by modifying aspects of 
a choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way, with the key characteristic that 
nudges do not forbid any options or significantly change agents’ economic incentives. While nudging and 
behavioral policy-making are sometimes used as synonymous in the literature, nevertheless we want to 
emphasize that nudging interventions are only one specific type of the several behavioral policies which 
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biases and redirect patterns of behavior that are supposed to hurt people.8 Therefore, 
the goal of behavioral policy-making is to correct decisions that produce “sub-opti-
mal” outputs and to redirect them toward alternatives that make people “better off.” 
However, what does “optimal” mean in the context of behavioral policy-making?
This article focuses on the important methodological problem of identifying a 
suitable welfare criterion for behavioral policy-making. We will argue that, despite 
the fact that behavioral interventions are implemented at increasing rate, no convinc-
ing theory has been advanced yet regarding how to identify the “optimal” choice and 
what it means to make individuals “better off.”9 Traditional economic analysis relies 
on Samuelson’s theory of revealed preferences to determine its welfare criterion.10 
According to this theory, by observing the choices of individuals it is possible to 
discover their true underlying preferences. However, behavioral policies cannot rely 
on this preference-based criterion for optimality.11 In fact, neoclassical utility maxi-
mization theory is based on the assumption that whatever action an individual vol-
untarily chooses must be welfare enhancing. Thus, it does not make sense to evalu-
ate whether an agent is making a sub-optimal decision using a benchmark measure 
built on the premise that people always make optimal choices. Hence, the behavio-
ral revolution left open a key normative question: which welfare criterion should be 
adopted for behavioral policy-making?
It is important to emphasize that the problem of finding a suitable welfare 
criterion is a distinctive feature of behavioral policy-making. This problem is 
qualitatively different from issues faced by a policy-maker who assumes rational 
agents, such as the difficulty in choosing “optimal” levels of taxes or incentives. 
In fact, it is well known that fully rational (in economic sense) agents can still 
achieve a sub-optimal social outcome in cases where externalities or public goods 
are present. Policy-makers called to correct these market failures might face 
severe practical problems. For instance, imagine that a policy-maker wants to 
achieve an “optimal” level of pollution by imposing an environmental tax on a 
firm that engages in a polluting activity. To achieve optimality, the tax has to be 
set in such a way that the firm is fully internalizing the benefits and the costs of 
its activity. Setting the right tax might be complicated in practice, since the pol-
icy-maker has no direct access to information regarding the costs of pollution and 
the benefit of environmental protection. Therefore, the lack of a price for certain 
8 Loewenstein and Haisley (2008).
9 See, for instance, Nussbaum (1997).
10 Samuelson (1938).
11 This point is made clear by Mullane and Sheffrin (2012, 10).
policy-makers could use to direct people toward better choices. Indeed, behavioral policy-making goes 
well beyond nudges. In particular, behavioral policy-making, besides using freedom preserving and usu-
ally low-cost interventions that modify the choice architectures characteristic of nudges, also supports a 
broader range of policy instruments that include traditional forms of intervention (e.g., regulations and 
incentives). In Sect. 2, we provide a deeper review of the characteristics of nudging as a special subset of 
behavioral policy. Please notice that the critical reflections which can be found in the literature, and that 
we summarize in the following sections, refer both to behavioral policy-making in general and to nudg-
ing. See further on the definition of nudging also Hansen (2016).
Footnote 7 (continued)
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commodities that unambiguously reveals its market value imposes to the policy-
maker the need to engage in some estimation procedures to indirectly retrieve 
this information. For instance, the market value of clean air can be estimated by 
identifying a set of residential houses sharing identical characteristics and com-
paring market prices of those located in proximity of a landfill with those far 
away from it. The problem of achieving optimal pollution levels is an information 
problem: as long as through some clever procedure the policy-maker acquires the 
market evaluation of a certain good as revealed by consumers’ choices, she can 
identify what the optimal level of pollution is (and so, how the environmental tax 
should be set). Conversely, this is not the case in the context of behavioral policy-
making. Indeed, as we explain in detail in the next sections, the pillar of behavio-
ral policy-making is that observed choices do not necessarily reflect consumers’ 
underlying preferences. Therefore, even if scholars would agree on a procedure 
to estimate the market values of a good as revealed by consumers’ choices, the 
problem of defining what “optimal” means would not be solved. So far few theo-
ries have been proposed, but no consensus has been reached, regarding how to 
identify these preferences.
We contribute to the debate on the methodological problems of behavioral policy-
making by taking a law and economics approach. Our contribution is twofold. First, 
we raise awareness against an important issue in behavioral policy-making that is at 
times overlooked by scholars and practitioners. Some recent contributions (reviewed 
in the next section) emphasize the problem of identifying individuals’ preferences 
faced by behavioral policy-making. We focus on the link between abandoning 
revealed preferences and the possibility for governments to make use of behavio-
ral interventions to restrict citizens’ freedom. The revealed preferences approach, 
despite its aforementioned limitations set out by cognitive psychology, guarantees 
the respect of individuals’ freedom of choices. Conversely, rejecting the idea that 
people choose what they prefer without providing a solid alternative theoretical 
framework in principle countenance any freedom-reducing intervention, on the basis 
that individuals’ choices are “mistakes” or “products of biases.” In this article, we 
stress that abandoning revealed preferences does not simply create a methodological 
problem of preferences identification. Instead, in the absence of clear rules regulat-
ing the use of behavioral policies, it might also affect liberty and individual freedom.
In the second part of the article, we propose a solution to the problems caused 
by the lack of a suitable welfare criterion. On the one hand, we aim at leaving open 
for policy-makers the opportunity to make use of the potential of behavioral policy-
making and, on the other hand, we want to limit the possibility for the executive to 
justify freedom-reducing interventions. We argue that, for implementing behavioral 
policies in a safe way, the boundaries and domains of application of behavioral pol-
icy-making should be clearly defined ex ante, and we emphasize that it is necessary 
to agree upon precise procedural requirements. We therefore propose that behavioral 
interventions must adhere to guiding principles of the highest order, such as impos-
ing special procedural requirements and including mandatory public participation to 
implement changes. By defining the rules of the game, the scopes and the limits of 
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application, these “constitutional-type” guiding principles should regulate behavio-
ral policy-making.12
We will proceed as follows. In the next section, we sketch the rise of the behav-
ioral approach into policy-making. In the same section, we also summarize the criti-
cisms that have been formulated by the scientific community on the use of behav-
ioral interventions. Next, we focus on the methodological problem of behavioral 
policy-making and the many unresolved issues (3). We therefore propose a solution 
which focuses on procedures and rules (hence a “constitution”) that limit the pos-
sibility for the government to abuse its position (4). The conclusion summarizes the 
content of our proposal (5).
2  Behavioral policy‑making
2.1  A movement on the rise
There is an increasing popularity of using behavioral policy-making tools among 
policy-makers. Behavioral insight teams are at work inter alia in the USA, the UK 
and a few other countries are equally opening branches for applied behavioral pol-
icy-making, including the EU Commission.13
The US government recently began a process for institutionalizing the imple-
mentation of behavioral insights into policy-making. In September 2009, Chicago 
Professor Cass Sunstein—the author of various influential articles on behavioral 
policy-making and co-author of the best seller Nudge—was appointed Director of 
the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The objec-
tive was to make the US regulatory system as sensible and user-oriented as possi-
ble. Under Sunstein’s mandate, terminated in 2012, OIRA promoted the use of dis-
closure and implemented important simplifications in the regulatory process. In an 
attempt to push further the implementation of behavioral policy-making, in Septem-
ber 2015 President Obama issued the Executive Order “Using Behavioral Science 
Insights to Better Serve the American People” that requires US Federal Agencies to 
implement behavioral insights when designing government policies.14
12 As it will become clear in the remainder of the article, we obviously refer to a “constitution” in the 
material sense, being a document that provides precise and strict guiding principles and procedures. 
However, it should be emphasized that we are not pleading for including behavioral policy-making guid-
ing principles in existing constitutions or changing/amending those constitutions. Instead, we refer to a 
“constitution for behavioral policy-making” to stress that these principles should not merely be guide-
lines in the way they already exist, for example, by the UK Office of Fair Trading, but that they should be 
of a much higher order.
13 In this section, we focus on behavioral policies either that are explicitly designed on the basis of previ-
ous behavioral evidence or that are implemented after a randomized control-trial testing procedure. How-
ever, as noted by Lourenço et al. in the Behavioural Insights Applied to Policy EU Report 2016, there 
are also a large number of behavioral policy initiatives whose design implicitly incorporates behavioral 
insights without, however, referring to behavioral theories or being subject to ad hoc testing.
14 White House Executive Order, available at https ://www.white house .gov/the-press -offic e/2015/09/15/
execu tive-order -using -behav ioral -scien ce-insig hts-bette r-serve -ameri can (accessed 5-3-2016).
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Even before this, the US government had implemented several federal regulations 
that incorporate behavioral insights. One of the fields targeted by important behavio-
ral interventions concerns pension policy. The US Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 
2006 makes use of defaults in order to increase the rate of savings among workers.15 
Moreover, the PPA has also a default of “contribution escalators,” hence encourag-
ing participants to slightly increase over time their contribution to the pension fund. 
The mechanism was implemented after an assessment of the Save More Tomor-
row (SMT) plan, whereby savings decisions resulting from voluntary participa-
tion in a 401(k) plan with yearly escalations in contribution rates were significantly 
increasing.16 A widespread use of behavioral policy interventions can be found 
in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 2010. For instance, 
PPACA regulation requires menu-labeling to disclose nutrient information. Simi-
larly, the institution of the White House Task Force on Childhood Obesity (WHT-
FCO). WHTFCO’s objective is to reduce tweens’ health problems associated with 
an unhealthy lifestyle by changing social norms through the manipulation of sali-
ency. The “Spot the Block” campaign, where young people are motivated to use the 
nutrition facts label (“the block”) when comparing foods and the mandate for mid-
dle schools to increase options for healthful eating are other examples of behavioral 
interventions. At the state level, an increasing number of campaigns leverage social 
influence and social norms effects to achieve the regulator’s objective. A highly cited 
example is the “Don’t Mess with Texas” campaign against littering, that is generally 
considered very successful.17 A second famous example is the OPOWER project, 
where letters that convey social norms messages raise awareness in households of 
the need to decrease energy consumption.18
Also, European Member State governments and the European Commission are 
increasingly active in bringing behavioral insights into legislation and regulatory 
interventions, as well as in establishing and developing organizations that institu-
tionalize this implementation. The Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights19 consti-
tutes the first attempt, followed by many other interventions in subsequent years, to 
explicitly implement findings of behavioral sciences into policy-making. In 2014, 
a Foresight and Behavioral Insight Unit at the Joint Research Centre of the Euro-
pean Commission was created. At a national level, in 2010 the UK established the 
Behavioural Insight Team (BIT), which as of today has performed more than 150 
randomized control-trial evaluations of behavioral policy interventions. Following 
UK examples, also Netherlands, Germany, France and Denmark established national 
organizations with the task to incorporate behavioral insights into policy-making 
and in other European countries, like Austria and Finland, the possibility of estab-
lishing similar institutions is currently under discussion. The European Commis-
sion Report “Behavioural Insights Applied to Policy” published in 2016 identifies 
15 Beshears et al. (2010).
16 Thaler and Benartzi (2004).
17 Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 60–61).
18 Congdon et al. (2011).
19 Directive 2011/83 of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, OJ L 304/64 of 21 November 2011.
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more than 200 examples of behavioral policy initiatives in EU member states in 
fields such as competition, consumer protection, employment, energy, environment, 
health, finance, taxation, transport.20 The report highlights that the number of behav-
ioral interventions is rapidly growing.
International organizations are also increasingly encouraging the application 
of behavioral sciences principles to policy-making. In 2014, the OECD published 
a report engaging in a systematic review of behavioral policy applications across 
the world.21 The 2015 World Development Report of the World Bank highlights the 
need to advise development policies with findings from behavioral sciences in order 
to increase the effectiveness of development aids.22
2.2  The big push to behavioral policy‑making: nudging
One way of proceeding that has become very popular for implementing behavioral 
policies, bypassing at the same time the potential disadvantages of direct regulatory 
intervention, has been the introduction of so-called libertarian paternalism, nudg-
ing23 or asymmetric paternalism.24 A nudge is a specific type of behavioral policy 
intervention that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way but, in contrast to 
other behavioral policy-making approaches, it operates by modifying the “choice 
architecture” of a decision situation, while preserving the same set of decision 
options and keeping unchanged the costs associated with a decision.25
The difference between nudging and the broader set of behavioral policy-making 
tools can be illustrated with an example. Installing a device in a car that does not allow 
it to start if the driver is positive to an alcohol test is not a nudge, even if the installa-
tion is imposed by a central authority, or if it is voluntarily implemented by the driver. 
Indeed, such a device actually changes the choice set of the agents. (The drunk per-
son who would “rationally” prefer to drive can no longer do so.) This is a traditional 
behavioral intervention, but not of the nudging type. It is rather an intervention within 
the framework of “mindless economics”26 where a sophisticated agent uses a commit-
ment device that restricts his choice set because he anticipates that, once in an altered 
state of mind, he would just start the car. Conversely, an example of nudging is placing 
at the entrance of a cafeteria salads and fruits before less healthy foods. Since the lay-
out of food influences people’s choice of consumption, placing low-fat food first pro-
motes healthy outcomes (inattentive or uninterested people consume more salads and 
fruits) without restricting the freedom of choice of the others. (Individuals preferring 
less healthy food do not have to make extra effort or pay higher prices to consume it.)
The charm of the libertarian paternalistic approach is that it seems to be less intru-
sive than direct government regulation and that it would merely nudge individuals 
21 Lunn (2014).
22 The World Bank (2015).
23 Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 72).
24 Camerer et al. (2003).
25 Thaler and Sunstein (2003).
26 See Gul and Pesendorfer (2005).
20 Lourenço et al. (2016).
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into better decisions without directly forcing or imposing additional costs on them.27 
Libertarian paternalism would softly nudge individuals toward the “right” decision, 
for example by sending to households letters that convey social norms messages 
aimed at reducing energy consumptions28 or by increasing savings for retirement 
exploiting the “sticky” character of the savings retirement plan for employees that is 
offered as a default.29
2.3  Critiques to behavioral policy‑making
Behavioral policy-making, including nudging, attracts widespread criticism, and 
some scholars are reluctant to support the use of the behavioral approach to formu-
late policy recommendations.30 Lawyers have argued that behavioral interventions 
may be undemocratic (as they are usually a tool for the executive)31 and that for-
mal legal review of measures based on behavioral policy-making may be lacking.32 
Some disapprovals relate to the fact that it would violate the autonomy of choice of 
individuals, harming their liberty,33 hence potentially even violating human rights.34 
Others hold that behavioral policies, especially when camouflaged as seemingly 
innocent nudges, are manipulative35 and violating human dignity.36
It has also been argued that behavioral economics may point at a variety of human 
errors, but that these do not necessarily imply regulatory interventions. According to 
this position, before engaging in behavioral interventions it should first be examined 
how individuals are themselves capable of (partially) remedying errors by learn-
ing in order to improve their situation.37 John List, for instance, showed in various 
experiments that, as participants gain experience in market transactions, some of the 
cognitive biases disappear.38 Also Korobkin and Ulen held that the legal implica-
tions of particular behavioral phenomena are not clear cut at all.39
27 In the words of Thaler and Sunstein: “Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak, soft, and non-intru-
sive type of paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened. If people 
want to smoke cigarettes, to eat a lot of candy, to choose an unsuitable healthcare plan, or to fail to save 
for retirement, libertarian paternalists will not force them to do otherwise—or even make things hard for 
them. Still, the approach we recommend does count as paternalistic, because private and public choice 
architects are […] self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will make their lives bet-
ter. They nudge.” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 5–6).
28 Congdon et al. (2011).
29 Choi et al. (2003) and Carroll et al. (2009).
30 For a summary of the critics in this respect, see inter alia Hansen and Jespersen (2013) and Tor 
(2008, 318–325).
31 McCrudden and King (2015, 123) and Hansen and Jespersen (2013, 5).
32 Van Aaken (2015a).
33 Rebonato (2012).
34 Alemanno and Spina (2014, 446).
35 Young (2012).
36 McCrudden and King (2015, 100–104).
37 Epstein (2006, 130).
38 List (2003, 2006).
39 Korobkin and Ulen (2000, 1097).
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Behavioral policy-making is also criticized from the perspective of social wel-
fare. Ogus held that there could still be welfare maximization notwithstanding the 
biases and hence no need for regulatory intervention.40 Moreover, he equally held 
that, if such an intervention took place, the question still arises whether the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Another criticism relates to the central point in our argument, 
being that it is not clear why the regulator or the “choice architect” would know 
better than individuals what is good for them. In the words of Glaser, “Public errors 
are as realistic a problem as private errors.”41 For instance, a report of the Science 
and Technology Select Committee of the Upper house of the United Kingdom Par-
liament in 2010 and 2011 makes clear that behavioral policy-making diverts gov-
ernments from its responsibility to use other, more effective instruments and that it 
reduces opportunities for public deliberation and democratic discourse in favor of 
non-transparent, technocratic manipulation.42
We mentioned above the criticism that an integrated theory replacing the neoclas-
sical welfare economics framework is not provided by the behavioral approach.43 
Using similar arguments, Gigerenzer pointed at the fact that behavioral (law and) 
economics was questioned “for merely listing anomalies without providing a the-
ory.”44 In the next section, we discuss in detail the problem caused by the lack of a 
robust theoretical framework for behavioral policy-making.
3  The problem of setting the welfare criterion
A fundamental step in the economic analysis of social policy is concerned with eval-
uating the desirability of policy effects, that is, to produce normative statements. 
This normative analysis is the core of welfare economics, the branch of economic 
science evaluating well-being from the allocation of productive factors in terms of 
economic efficiency and desirability or resources allocation. According to social 
welfare philosophy (or utilitarian philosophy), it is necessary to evaluate different 
states of the world in terms of their end-state distributional results. In fact, the pur-
pose of welfare economics is to obtain a social ordering over alternative possible 
states of the world, thus promoting, when possible, normative principles.
The traditional economic approach relies on a welfare criterion based on the 
theory of revealed preferences.45 According to this theory, the preferences of indi-
viduals can be deducted from their observed behavior. Hence, standard consumer 
theory allows extrapolating public policy outcomes from the observation of private 
choices. A common way of interpreting the neoclassical approach is that people 
45 Samuelson (1938).
40 Ogus (2006, 250–252).
41 Glaser (2006, 134).
42 House of Lords, Science and Technology Select Committee Behaviour Change, Report (2011), HL-
paper 179, cited by McCrudden and King (2015, 84).
43 See also Tor (2008, 291).
44 Gigerenzer (2005, 61).
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have well-defined preference rankings and these rankings form the basis for wel-
fare analysis. A rational agent makes decisions as if he was able to consider and 
process all the available information, to engage in cost–benefit evaluations and to 
regulate present and future consumption according to his expectations. By relying 
on the revealed preferences approach, neoclassical welfare economic analysis does 
not distinguish between individuals’ choices and well-being. As a consequence, 
given his preferences, constraints and available information, the agent would end 
up making the choice that guarantees him the maximum (expected, if we talk about 
future outcomes) well-being. Hence, the neoclassical policy analyst derives which 
policy choice to make from the observation of private consumption choices made by 
individuals.
As we previously indicated, one result of the behavioral approach is that the 
assumption that we can deduct what is best for individuals from their actual behavior 
(revealed preferences) does not hold any longer, since the behavioral studies show 
precisely that individuals do not always make optimal choices. Experimental psy-
chologists and behavioral economists documented that in some situations of great 
economic relevance, individuals systematically depart from economists’ neoclassi-
cal assumption of rationality.46 Researchers found that decision-making processes 
are the result of two coexisting and interacting mental systems: an impulsive, short-
term focused one (“System 1”) and a reflexive, long-term oriented one (“System 
2”).47 While decisions made by System 2 would be fairly consistent with neoclassi-
cal economic predictions, nevertheless the influence of System 1 is responsible for 
the aforementioned biases.48 The problem with System 1 is that, when people make 
decisions on the basis of emotions, neglecting information or attaching exagger-
ated weight to the present, they might end up making choices contrary to their own 
self-interest. For example, they could take excessive risks, make decisions that they 
will later regret or forego possibilities of high future gains in order to avoid small 
immediate costs.49 The basic problem of those heuristics and biases is that individu-
als apparently often make decisions that seem sub-optimal from the perspective of 
maximization of expected utility. In some cases, they behave differently than what 
their preferences would lead us to expect.
However, recognizing that individuals might not choose what they want creates 
problems with respect to the identification of a suitable welfare criterion that the pol-
icy-maker uses to maximize social welfare. So far, among behavioral economists no 
consensus regarding the standards and criteria to adopt has been emerged. Broadly 
speaking, it is possible to identify two schools of thought. On the one hand, in the 
opinion of some scholars policy evaluations must maintain a strict adherence to the 
doctrine of revealed preferences. According to this view, observed “anomalies” in 
46 For an overview, see, for example, Beshears et al. (2008), Della Vigna (2009), Kahneman (2003) and 
Akerlof and Shiller (2010).
47 See Kahneman (2011) for a discussion of this point; see Hsu et al. (2005) for a contribution that iden-
tifies the neural correlates responsible for the activation of different areas of the brain connected with the 
two systems.
48 Loewenstein and Haisley (2008).
49 Camerer et al. (2004).
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individuals’ decision making should be explained by an extension of the prefer-
ences domain, as, for example, in Gul and Pesendorfer.50 On the other hand, other 
researchers investigated the possibility to relax, modify, or depart from the principle 
of revealed preferences in conducing welfare analysis. In Sect. 3.1, we review the 
attempts to relax the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory and the proposed 
solutions, highlighting problematic issues as well as open questions in Sect. 3.2.
3.1  Relaxing the assumptions at the basis of welfare economics analysis
Following Bernheim and Rangel,51 we can say that neoclassical welfare economics 
analysis is based on four key assumptions:
1. Coherent preferences: each individual has coherent and well-organized prefer-
ences.
2. Preference domain: the set of state-contingent consumption paths that an indi-
vidual exhibits during his life constitutes his preferences domain.
3. Fixed lifetime preferences: individuals do not change over time, or across states 
of the world, the rank order of lifetime state-contingent consumption paths.
4. No mistakes: Each individual always choose the preferred option among the 
feasible ones given his choice set.
In the remainder of this section, we review how scholars identified behavioral 
anomalies that violate these four assumptions and the attempts to produce theories 
that relax each of them.
3.1.1  Relaxing coherent preferences
The assumption of coherent preferences implies that people’s decisions are well 
defined and that they are not influenced by irrelevant details or by the context in 
which they are taken. However, starting with the pioneering work of Tversky and 
Kahneman,52 behavioral scientists show that observed choices are highly context-
dependent and that framing greatly influences individuals’ decision. Given these 
observations, some scholars proposed welfare criteria that are no longer based 
on the notion of allocation of resources. These contributions introduce a separa-
tion between positive models describing choices and normative models describing 
welfare.53
Along this line the capabilities approach was developed, first advocated by Sen54 
and later by Nussbaum.55 This approach rejects the standard preference-based 
50 Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004).
51 Bernheim and Rangel (2012).
52 Tvesky and Kahneman (1981, 1986).
53 See Kahneman (2011, 269–374).
54 Sen (1985, 1999).
55 Nussbaum (2001).
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measurement of welfare on the basis of the concept of hedonic adaptation: People 
adjust individual preferences and expectations to social conditions and to the sur-
rounding environment. Therefore, choices made by agents in a specific situation 
might not just reveal individual preferences but instead could show that people 
adapted their preferences to the specific circumstances in an attempt to achieve fea-
sible goals. Sen and Nussbaum argue in favor of a normative theory of welfare that 
is based on what people are capable of achieving, given surrounding social condi-
tions and the opportunity offered to them. Nussbaum goes further proposing a set of 
fundamental human capabilities on which this theory should be based.
A notion of welfare based on opportunities that share some common points with 
the capabilities approach is the one advocated by Sugden.56 In his contribution, Sug-
den formulates a rigorous welfare criterion that justifies the use of opportunities as 
welfare standard. Both the capabilities approach and the opportunity criterion solve 
the problem of hedonic adaptation and overcome the revealed preference theory 
assumption that choices are always welfare enhancing. Nonetheless, these criteria 
create for the policy-maker the problem of determining which capabilities or oppor-
tunities must be valued.
Adler (2012) argues in favor of the concept of “extended preferences” as the cri-
terion for behavioral policy-making. According to the author, the evaluations of the 
policy-maker should consider as a foundational criterion agents’ “fully informed, 
fully rational extended preferences regarding life-histories, life history lotteries, and 
comparisons to non-existence” (p. 261).
Finally, Beshears et al. (2008) propose a distinction between revealed and “nor-
mative” preferences, also arguing that the concepts do not necessarily coincide. The 
authors specify a set of situations and factors that make more likely to register this 
separation: passive choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-party 
marketing, and intertemporal choice. The article then discusses frameworks that 
could contribute to estimate normative preferences when they do not coincide with 
revealed preferences, such as structural estimation, active decisions, and the use of 
reported preferences.
3.1.2  Relaxing preference domain
It is possible to identify two classes of behavioral anomalies that are inexplicable 
through the neoclassical approach but that allow for a welfare analysis if one extends 
the preference domain. The first anomaly involves temptation and self-control, the 
second is constituted of social preferences.
Empirical evidence suggests that in a variety of situations individuals engage in 
time-inconsistent choices and that they rely on various forms of pre-commitment.57 
The solution proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer58 consists of defining the preference 
domain over both allocations and choice sets. If individuals are sophisticated and 
56 Sugden (2004).
57 Ameriks et al. (2007).
58 Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).
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can correctly forecast the effect of future temptations, they could prefer to constrain 
future alternatives even when constraints should not have any impact on actual 
choices. For instance, a sophisticated individual wanting to save for the Christmas 
period could correctly forecast his inability to avoid shopping during the summer 
sale season. Therefore, he could prefer a commitment device that limits her future 
choice set. For example, she could opt for a special savings account that, holding 
constant the benefits offered, additionally imposes the payment of a penalty for 
money withdrawn before the month of December.59 It is important to notice that the 
Gul-Pesendorfer framework, however, does not imply a departure from the revealed 
preference approach. Indeed, individuals maintain, as in the neoclassical framework, 
the same lifetime preferences ranking at every moment in time (e.g., without the 
penalty for withdrawal, the individual would recognize as welfare-maximizing the 
decision to shop during the summer sales, and she explicitly imposes a constraint 
because she understands the value of temptation). Therefore, welfare evaluation 
could be performed by discovering the revealed preferences, assuming that the pol-
icy analyst imposes a suitable structure on the choice data.
Behavioral anomalies within the class of social preferences include sharing allo-
cations even without reputation or reciprocity,60 the equality concerns61 and the 
effects of conformity and social influence.62 Behavioral economists proposed mod-
els where individuals’ preferences are defined both over their own and other indi-
viduals’ consumption bundles. Again, this procedure does not imply abandoning the 
revealed preferences approach: once a suitable structure is imposed on consumption 
data, the policy analyst can infer individuals’ preferences by observing their con-
sumption choices.
3.1.3  Relaxing fixed lifetime preferences
The aforementioned evidence of time-inconsistent behavior and various forms of 
pre-commitment motivate also the relaxation of this assumption. Broadly speak-
ing, scholars have adopted two modeling strategies. One possible strategy consists 
of endowing individuals with well-behaved lifetime preferences that vary at differ-
ent points in time.63 Alternatively, one can allow lifetime preferences to be differ-
ent across states of nature.64 Once these preferences have been measured, then in 
order to conduct welfare analysis the policy analyst has to aggregate them. Aggre-
gating these preferences within a single individual requires a procedure similar to 
the aggregation of preferences in a multi-agent situation. (Indeed, here the modeling 
strategy implies that we aggregate over “multiple selves.”) A branch of the literature 
59 Ayres (2010).
60 See Engel (2011) for a meta-analysis of the Dictator game.
61 For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
62 For literature reviews, see Cialdini and Trost (1998) and Fabbri and Carbonara (2017).
63 Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001).
64 Loewenstein (1996) and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004).
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exploits this analogy.65 Another branch of the literature instead proposes to base 
welfare analysis on the selection of reasonably stable components of preferences.66 
Bernheim and Rangel67 provide a formal justification for the use of this criterion.
3.1.4  Relaxing no mistakes
Evidence that preferences and choices diverge motivates a relaxation of the fourth 
assumption. First of all, there are cases where almost everyone agrees that individu-
als do not necessarily make choices following their own self-interest, as in the cases 
of children or agents who are affected by serious mental disorder. More generally, 
any of the behavioral anomalies we mention as a motivation for the relaxation of the 
first three assumptions could justify the relaxation of the fourth.
3.2  What welfare criterion for behavioral policy‑making? Solution proposed 
and problems
Neoclassical welfare economics restricts the source of utility to individual’s judg-
ments and to goods and services that he himself consumes. Therefore, the policy 
analyst operating in the framework of welfare economics has to discard any other 
aspect not affecting individuals’ utility. Hence, what is good or bad for society 
reflects what is good or bad for the individuals belonging to the society. The analyst 
is supposed to “suspend his individual value judgment and act as each individual’s 
proxy.”68
Conversely, a common distinctive tract of all the attempts to relax neoclassical 
economic assumptions mentioned above is the division between a positive analy-
sis of policy effects and a normative evaluation of well-being. This division allows 
behavioral policy analysts to engage in issues of great social importance. They can, 
for example, meaningfully address the questions raised by self-destructive behav-
iors or make a sense of the claim that the average household saves “too little” for 
retirement.
However, departing from the revealed preference approach and assuming that 
people do not choose what they prefer raises problematic issues. The revealed pref-
erences approach guarantees individuals’ freedom of choice, and it protects indi-
viduals’ choices against a priori condemnations. Once this approach is abandoned, 
in principle governments become entitled to the possibility to condemn individu-
als’ choices and to set “beneficial” restrictions of personal freedom. Therefore, 
given this possibility, the determination of precise standards of evidence and pro-
cedures for departing from the principle of revealed preferences and the determi-
nation of an alternative welfare criterion acquires special importance in behavioral 
policy-making.
65 E.g. Laibson (1997).
66 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
67 Bernheim and Rangel (2012).
68 Bernheim and Rangel (2005, 5).
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The literature on this topic is still in its infancy, and a consensus has not yet been 
reached among scholars. Broadly speaking, engaging in behavioral policy-making 
requires dealing with two unsolved issues. A first major challenge consists in the 
identification of preferences once the revealed preference approach is abandoned. 
A second issue concerns setting precise criteria and standards for abandoning the 
revealed preference approach.
3.2.1  Issue 1: Identification of preferences
Two basic approaches have been advanced for the identification of preferences. 
First, some scholars propose to identify preferences using choice data through an 
estimation of structural models that incorporate behavioral assumptions about the 
decision-making processes.69 This process might sound odd at first glance: How is it 
possible to falsify the revealed preferences principle using choice data only? Indeed, 
the limitation of these models is that they test the hypothesis of no mistakes jointly 
with the hypothesis regarding the structure of the decision-making processes that are 
implicit in the model. Therefore, any evidence of discrepancy between preferences 
and choices holds as long as the specific non-choice evidence used to motivate the 
behavioral assumptions of the model holds.
Second, an alternative approach for the identification of preferences consists in 
combining choice and non-choice data. One possibility advanced first by Kahneman 
et al.70 is to measure individual well-being on the basis of self-reported evaluations 
of happiness. Kahneman names this approach “experience utility” as opposed to the 
“decision utility” based on revealed preferences that is usually embraced in econom-
ics. Experience utility has received significant attention by economists, and in recent 
years there have been important methodological advances regarding the possibility 
of implementing this measure for welfare evaluations.71 In particular, some schol-
ars propose to use this measure of utility in the context of policy evaluations and 
for identifying appropriate societal trade-off.72 Moreover, some scholars even argue 
that happiness should constitute the main goal of policy.73 From the perspective of 
behavioral policy-making, happiness measures of welfare have the advantage of 
being independent from individual choices. Therefore, people’s self-reported happi-
ness, as a consequence of the different choices made, could be employed as a crite-
rion for steering behaviors toward the happiness-maximizing alternative.
However, happiness as a welfare criterion presents several problems.74 First, 
people seem to adapt relatively quickly to circumstances and set the reference point 
for happiness evaluation accordingly. For instance, empirical evidence shows that 
69 See, for example, Benkert and Netzer (2015), Goldin (2015), Goldin and Reck (2015) and Laibson 
et al. (2007).
70 Kahneman et al. (1997).
71 See, for example, Kahneman et al. (2004) and Frey and Stutzer (2010).
72 Layard and Layard (2011) and Bruni (2007).
73 Duncan (2013).
74 See Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) for a detailed discussion of each of the following points.
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people suffering from permanent disabilities place a high value on their health but 
do not show significant differences in the happiness level if compared with a control 
sample of non-disabled people.75 Hence, measures of welfare grounded on experi-
ence utility would suggest policies that fail to capture people’s preferences. Moreo-
ver, happiness measures are extremely sensible to a wide range of non-normative 
and volatile factors, such as the happiness of surrounding people, states of mind, 
emotions, or weather conditions.76 These problems question the possibility of using 
happiness as the welfare criterion for policy analysis.
3.2.2  Issue 2: Setting precise criteria and standards for abandoning the revealed 
preference approach
First, a welfare criterion that does not truly depart from the basic assumption of 
the preference-based approach is known as “Informed Decision Utility.” This crite-
rion requires policy-makers to ensure that agents are truly informed when they are 
making their choices. Hence, it suggests the provision of warnings against possible 
decision biases and facilitating agents’ gathering of information about the object of 
choice. Furthermore, in  situations where agents tend to underappreciate the risks 
or the long-term consequences of certain actions, informed decision utility policies 
expose and make these consequences salient to agents.
One problem with this approach is that policy-makers have to engage in value 
judgments, deciding which ones require policy interventions among the infinite 
range of situations where information could be improved. Similarly, information 
is unlikely to be “neutral”: the choice involved might be affected in opposite ways 
according to the framing of the information provided. Therefore, deciding how to 
convey the information involves adopting some form of welfare criterion that is not 
specified. A further limitation of this approach is that it addresses only problems of 
sub-optimal decisions deriving from a lack of attention or information, but does not 
offer solutions for mistakes deriving from self-control problems. Either naïve agents 
unaware of the behavioral biases leading them to poor decisions, or sophisticated 
individuals that are seeking solutions for their self-control problems would actually 
derive little benefit from just being told about the problem without being offered a 
solution.
Second, an interesting proposal is advanced by Bernheim and Rangel.77 The 
authors suggest using findings and advances in applied psychology and neuro-
sciences in order to establish evidence of errors in the brain process mechanisms. 
While the proposal is intriguing and promising for future applications, unfortunately 
we are still far from having a knowledge of neuroscience that is sufficiently solid to 
constitute the pillar of policy analysis.
Therefore, in recent studies Goldin (2015) and Goldin and Reck (2015) propose 
two approaches to overcome the problem of identifying behavioral preferences that 
75 Ubel et al. (2005).
76 Kahneman and Krueger (2006).
77 Bernheim and Rangel (2004).
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do not abandon the revealed preferences framework. The two approaches, labeled by 
the authors “Augmented Revelatory Frame Approach” and “Demographic Extrap-
olation Approach,” suggest a way to identify behavioral preferences, respectively, 
in settings where agents’ choices could be observed and in settings where revela-
tory frames are unavailable. The basic idea underlying the two approaches is that 
the preferences of the “consistent” or rational agent could be identified and used 
as a benchmark in order to estimate the deviation of the inconsistent agent. While 
these approaches represent certainly a step ahead in the identification of a suitable 
welfare criterion for behavioral policy-making, at the same time they raise critiques 
and concerns regarding the philosophical underpinning of the conceptual construc-
tion. For instance, Infante et  al. (2016) argue that the process of “purification” of 
preferences from behavioral biases presupposes the existence of a dualistic model of 
human being—an inner rational agent trapped in a psychological shell—that is prob-
lematic from a psychological and philosophical perspective. Even more fundamen-
tally, Isoni et  al. (2016) question whether observed choices can reveal underlying 
individual preferences without at the same time shaping them, therefore questioning 
the possibility of basing the welfare criterion on observed choices.
Fourth, Camerer et al.78 have proposed another criterion for abandoning the adop-
tion of behavioral policies. The authors claim that in “ideal” conditions the policy 
would help people who behave in a sub-optimal manner, but would have no impact 
on the behavior of the people who already make optimal choices. Hence, default 
rules or framing alternatives seem to satisfy this criterion, since they may steer inat-
tentive people toward advantageous alternatives without imposing any mandate on 
others. On the other hand, the authors recognize that many policies, while bene-
ficial for biased agents, would impose costs on those who are rationally choosing 
the optimal outcome. Hence, they propose a “looser but pragmatic” criterion based 
on cost–benefit analysis: to implement a policy whenever its aggregate benefits for 
behaviorally biased individuals exceed the costs imposed on unbiased agents. While 
this criterion is useful in shifting the discussion from the abstract concepts of auton-
omy and freedom to the more concrete measures of benefits and costs (where losses 
of freedom and autonomy are treated as a cost), nonetheless it does not address the 
main point of finding a welfare measure that is not preference-based.
Finally, a more comprehensive proposal has been advanced by Loewenstein and 
Haisley.79 The authors argue that behavioral policies should be safely implemented 
when “welfare judgment tends to be relatively straightforward.” In order to identify 
these situations, they propose a set of suitable conditions:
• Dominance: there are frequent situations in which people simply “leave money 
on the table,” as in the case of an employee who could contribute to her savings 
account, benefitting from the employer’s matching contribution and withdraw 
the full deposit the same day without penalty.80 Unless we rely on the unrealis-
78 Camerer et al. (2003).
79 Loewenstein and Haisley (2008, 221).
80 Choi et al. (2011).
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tic assumption that people show non-monotonic preferences for money, in these 
situations it is clear that some behavioral bias is the cause of sub-optimal deci-
sion outcomes. This criterion could also be extended to stochastic dominance. 
According to stochastic dominance, policy interventions are justified if, in a situ-
ation involving an agent’s choice with risks, the returns are maximized at any 
possible level of risk. For example, people including their own stock in their 
retirement portfolio show a behavior that violates stochastic dominance.
• Clearly Negative Outcomes: sometimes people’s decisions generate outcomes 
that are detrimental from any perspective. For example, many householders in 
the USA borrow from credit cards at a rate of approximately 18% and at the 
same time lend money getting a fixed return of 6%.81 In a situation like this, peo-
ple simply fail to take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity, leaving therefore 
money on the table. Behavioral policy interventions seem not to require further 
justification in similar situations.
• Self-officiating: Obese people, gamblers, or drug addicts constantly report that 
they would be better off were they able to modify their behavior regarding food, 
gambling, or drug consumption. In these situations, it seems reasonable to imple-
ment libertarian paternalistic policies to help them to achieve the desired goals. 
Loewenstein and Haisley82 state this condition specifying that they embrace a 
concept of welfare based on preferences rather than choices. In fact, the authors 
recognize that in certain situations behavioral biases might drive individual 
choices in directions not reflecting inherent preferences.
3.3  The impasse of behavioral policy‑making
As this section so far has been made clear, the legal scholars pointing at poten-
tial limits and issues of behavioral policy-making83 can be supported from a law 
and economics approach as well. Behavioral policy-making violates the four core 
assumptions on which policy-making on the basis of welfare economic analysis was 
grounded. The problem is that we equally noted that an alternative for the revealed 
preference approach has not yet been developed in the literature in a satisfactory 
manner. The alternatives of deducting preferences from other approaches than the 
revealed preferences have their own limitations. It seems, for example, unsatisfac-
tory to base policy-making on the criterion of happiness. The second problem we 
identified is that a clear alternative with specific benchmarks for abandoning the 
revealed preference approach is also missing. Only the study by Loewenstein and 
Haisley mentioned above suggests a few basic conditions for when behavioral pol-
icy-making could be assumed to make individuals better off. Considering the current 
lack of an alternative comprehensive theory which could replace the revealed prefer-
ence approach, we propose to use a procedural solution which would limit the pos-
sibility for the government to engage in behavioral interventions to those situations 
81 Sunstein and Thaler (2003).
82 Loewenstein and Haisley (2008).
83 McCrudden and King (2015), Alemanno and Spina (2014), Van Aaken (2015a) and Young (2012).
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where it is most likely that the policy would indeed make individuals better off with-
out the government abusing its powers.
4  The way out: establishing the rules of the game for behavioral 
policy‑making through “constitutional‑type” guiding principles
We have indicated that, both from a legal and from a law and economics perspec-
tive, issues arise as far as the unrestricted use of behavioral policy-making is con-
cerned. The problem from a law and economics perspective is that, if policy-making 
is no longer based on the normative welfare criterion of revealed preferences, it is 
not clear on which criterion the policy-maker will base interventions. This always 
entails the risk that the policy-maker will paternalistically decide what is “best” 
for individuals, whereas it is not always clear that the intervention will indeed sat-
isfy their preferences. The problems identified from a legal perspective relate, inter 
alia, to the undemocratic nature of nudging, the lack of possibilities of legal review 
(which are instead possible in the case of formal regulation), the fact that behavioral 
interventions may violate autonomy and liberty of individuals and especially that it 
is not the democratically elected legislator, but rather the executive, who would be 
the “choice architect” and hence decide how to “nudge.”84
In order to limit these dangers, we propose that behavioral policy-making must 
adhere to “constitutional-type” guiding principles, where the conditions, under 
which behavioral policy-making would be possible, are clearly stipulated.85 Formu-
lating a constitution as a device whereby citizens collectively agree on the conditions 
under which certain measures can be taken has been often proposed in legal and law 
and economics scholarship. For instance, in light of terrorism a state of emergency 
is declared, which would justify taking exceptional measures. It is precisely for that 
reason that Bruce Ackerman held that “before the next attack” the conditions under 
which civil liberties can be limited or restricted should be carefully defined.86 The 
author works out a detailed system in which, depending upon the nature of the threat 
or danger, specific exceptions to civil liberties are possible, but where each time a 
board will also have to verify whether the specific conditions to justify the restric-
tions on civil liberties are still present. As Ackerman stresses, there are many advan-
tages in specifying those conditions in a correct procedure ex ante, precisely in order 
to prevent civil liberties from being jeopardized in a disproportionate manner.
From an economic perspective, the advantage of such constitutional-type rules 
is that they (1) require a super majority to change and (2) set forth the fundamen-
tal powers, duties, and structure of the government.87 These particular features 
would make constitutional-type rules attractive for behavioral policy-making. The 
84 See, inter alia, Van Aaken (2015a).
85 The proposal for a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making has been advanced in the literature 
also by Frey and Gallus (2016). However, the authors do not develop the idea further in the article.
86 Ackerman (2006, 77–100).
87 Posner (2011, 867) and Posner (1987).
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advantage would be that these rules would make it clear in which conditions the 
government could make use of behavioral policies and, perhaps more importantly, 
when it could not do so. Hence, constitutional-type guiding principles would set out 
what the rules of the game are and provide a unifying framework for behavioral 
policy-making, an aspect which is currently lacking. This set of rules would indicate 
when behavioral policies could be used, hence avoiding the criticism that it is the 
executive alone that, in a paternalistic manner, exploits behavioral interventions to 
impose its own choices.
In this sense, our proposal has some points in common with the argument devel-
oped by Buchanan and Tullock in the book “The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.”88 The authors argue that the normal 
dialectic of majoritarian democracies implies that, when voting on specific deci-
sions, the majority imposes its view and tramps minorities’ interests. In this sense, 
the democratic process is authoritarian when deciding about specific policies. How-
ever, according to Buchanan and Tullock, the fundamental aspect of the democratic 
process is that the majority and the minority agree ex ante on a set of constitutional 
rules concerning how decisions are made. Therefore, some rule for unanimity or full 
consent at the constitutional level of decision making is the necessary ingredient for 
democracies to work, while an agreement on specific policy issues between agents 
or coalitions involved in the political process is not a necessary condition. As it is 
the case for the constitutional rules prescribed by Buchanan and Tullock, also our 
proposal for constitutional-type guidelines for behavioral policy-making concerns 
the need for policy-makers and political parties to agree ex ante on a set of rules 
that specify the conditions necessary for the implementation of behavioral public 
policies and for the procedures to follow thereafter. Given this general framework, 
the implementation of specific behavioral policies by the executive would be con-
strained by the limits that actors have explicitly agreed upon, thus reducing concerns 
for potential misuses of this policy tool.
In the remainder of this section, we suggest four key components that should 
characterize constitutional-type guiding principles for behavioral policy-making.
4.1  Independent decision making
One important aspect of the constitutional-type rules is that they should make clear 
what the specific procedure is with which the government could engage in behav-
ioral policy-making. When particular criteria for allowing behavioral interventions 
have been determined, their decision making could be entrusted to an independent 
agency, consisting of experts, in psychology, economics, philosophy and law, who 
would examine whether in the particular case the conditions specified have been 
fulfilled. Entrusting the decision making to an independent agency that stands at 
some distance of the government would avoid some of the current political economy 
88 Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
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issues of behavioral policy-making.89 The role of the agency could be comparable to 
those used, for example, in risk regulation (or food safety), where a risk assessment 
is equally undertaken by a committee of independent experts.90
Moreover, in risk regulation it has often been stressed that a distinction should 
be made between risk assessment, which involves expert knowledge, and a broader 
assessment stage. In this second stage, the agency should also seek non-experts 
opinions, including minority views, to get a good grasp of, for example, the risks 
involved with introducing new technologies.91 Indeed, the scope of this second 
assessment is much broader and should include noneconomic considerations, such 
as the efficacy of possible options and their acceptability to the public. That is 
because the decision concerning, for instance, admitting a risky drug of which nei-
ther the benefits nor the costs are fully known, is not considered simply a technical 
decision. Hence, after the (technical) risk assessment in the risk management phase, 
other types of interests and observations should also be included before coming to 
a final decision. This multi-level procedure is reflected in the 2000 Communication 
on the Precautionary Principle of the European Commission.92 The Communica-
tion provides thus an important precedent for how an independent agency could take 
measures based on behavioral insights. Experts, for instance in cognitive psychology 
and behavioral economics, could in a first phase enlighten the policy-maker of the 
likely effect of particular measures for the majority of the population. However, in a 
second phase a broader debate could take place, including also the question whether 
the policy instruments, which would be based on behavioral insights and certain 
policies making use of behavioral interventions, would be considered as acceptable, 
in light of the potential of violating individual autonomy and liberty. The advantages 
that in the design of such a committee the policy-maker can rely on the experience 
in the field of risk regulation where it has, inter alia, been clarified how independent 
agencies can be structured in such a way that they work in the public interest.93
Interestingly, the EU communication equally held that measures taken on the 
basis of the precautionary principle94 should also be periodically reviewed in light 
of scientific progress and amended as necessary. We will come back to this point in 
subsection 4.4.
89 McCrudden and King criticize nudging for strongly fulfilling the agenda of a conservative-led govern-
ment in the UK (McCrudden and King 2015, 117–121).
90 See Vos (2013) and Vos and Wendler (2006).
91 See, inter alia, Bouder and Lofstedt (2013) and Alemanno (2014).
92 EU Commission, Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000), 1. See on this differ-
ence between risk assessment and risk management also Christoforou (2004) and Wiener (2004). The 
Communication holds that evaluating whether a particular (new) technology should be allowed in the 
face of uncertainty should start with a scientific evaluation identifying the degree of scientific uncer-
tainty. This is referred to as risk assessment. However, in a second phase, referred to as risk management, 
decision makers have to take the political responsibility to determine the “acceptable” level of risk for 
society.
93 An important element in this respect is the accountability of agency decisions (see Bovens 2007), but 
equally the possibility of public participation.
94 This principle broadly holds that scientific uncertainty in itself may not be a reason for a lack of 
action. For details, see Faure and Skogh (2003, 21–26).
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4.2  Meaningful public participation
Just as in the debate with respect to risk regulation, one could equally envisage that 
the decision concerning behavioral policy-making would also involve public partici-
pation.95 Again, this relies on a parallel with risk regulation where, at the stage of 
risk management, public participation may be involved. Obviously, this process has 
to be carefully organized.96
The advantage is that with this procedure some of the problems that lawyers 
have with behavioral policy-making as being undemocratic and showing insuffi-
cient respect for individual autonomy, liberty, or dignity could partially be tackled.97 
Indeed, the decision to use behavioral interventions in a specific domain would not 
rely solely on the expert opinion (on the usefulness and relative efficiency of the 
policy) but also on opinions of the public (on whether the particular nudge would be 
desirable and would not constitute a disproportional infringement on autonomy and 
individual liberty).
One issue is, however, that the literature indicating criteria for increasing the 
quality of agency decisions not only points to the importance of public participation 
in order to achieve democratic goals, but also points to transparency.98But a problem 
with nudging is that it “works best in the dark,”99 meaning that the transparency of 
the nudge may reduce its effectiveness. Hansen and Jespersen have, however, indi-
cated that it is possible to have some degree of transparency without necessarily 
reducing the effectiveness of nudging.100
4.3  Defining intervention domains
That brings us then to the contents of the test: constitutional-type guiding principles 
should indicate guidelines stating when behavioral policy interventions are allowed 
(and when not).101 One such guideline could be the principle of evidence mentioned 
above102: People have to leave money on the table, in which case the advantages 
of the nudge for any group are undisputed. Another guideline is the principle of 
stochastic dominance, which state that an individual decision can only be over-
turned, providing that this decision results stochastically dominated for any possible 
95 Again there is a parallel with risk regulation. After the BSE crisis, the importance of transparency and 
public participation in the decision making concerning food safety has equally been stressed in the litera-
ture and been incorporated at the policy level. See in that respect, inter alia, Vos (2013, 43–46); and see 
the contributions in Vos and Wendler (2006).
96 And to guarantee that such public participation takes place in an informed manner. See in that respect 
inter alia Lofstedt et al. (2011) and Lofstedt (2014).
97 For an example of legal problems that nudges could potentially face, see Van Aaken (2015b) who pro-
poses a thorough analysis of the constitutional limits of nudging in the context of German law.
98 See inter alia Coglianese et al. (2008).
99 Bovens (2008, 4) and Hansen and Jespersen (2013, 9).
100 Hansen and Jespersen (2013, 15–23).
101 For an alternative framework for a “responsible use of the nudge approach to behavior change” see 
the typology developed by Hansen and Jespersen (2013, 23–27).
102 See 3.2.2 in fine.
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outcome. For instance, an individual investing all his savings in stocks of the com-
panies where he is currently employed shows a lack of understanding of the risks 
connected with his decision. Also, the principle of clearly negative outcomes (when 
it is clear that people’s decisions generate outcomes that are detrimental in any per-
spective) and the principle of self-officiating (where individuals explicitly recognize 
that in particular situations behavioral biases drive their choices in directions not 
reflecting their preferences, like with gambling or drug consumption) could drive 
behavioral policy-making.
A further differentiation which can be reflected in the “constitution” is that the 
desirability of behavioral interventions may differ according to the various fields of 
the law. A distinction could be made in that respect between domains of the law 
where the explanatory power of the behavioral approach (as well as the policy rec-
ommendations) is relatively strong on the one hand and domains where that explan-
atory power is substantially weaker. For example, the case for behavioral inter-
ventions is usually better accepted in the case of consumer law, for example when 
informational remedies are suggested103 or in the case of standard form contracts.104 
It is, on the contrary, much more debated in the area of competition law where one 
author qualified behavioral antitrust as “not ready for the main stage.”105 It should be 
recalled that the criticism we formulated concerning the lack of an alternative para-
digm for the revealed preferences approach is a general one and therefore applies 
to any field of law. However, some interventions, suggested by the behavioral 
approach, may in particular domains of law be more in line with the traditional cri-
teria of welfare maximization than others and could therefore better fit in behavioral 
policy-making. A further differentiation of different fields of law and different types 
of legal rules in the “constitution” may therefore better define the boundaries of the 
use of behavioral insights. A logical consequence would be to limit interventions 
to legal domains and policy interventions where the literature considers the tension 
with the goal of welfare maximization. Finally, different types of behavioral inter-
ventions should be treated differently, according to the degree of violation of indi-
vidual autonomy. For instance, rules for simplifying information can be less strin-
gent than for nudges exploiting behavioral regularities to redirect behavior. Indeed, 
evidence shows that people have heterogeneous levels of appreciation for different 
types of nudges (Sunstein forthcoming).
To summarize the basic idea behind constitutional-type guidelines for defining 
intervention domains, we quote a passage from Ogus, where the author formulates 
some general criteria to evaluate paternalistic regulation that could equally apply to 
behavioral policy-making106:
103 See general Bar-Gill (2012) and Sibony (2014).
104 Faure and Luth (2011).
105 Van den Begh (2013).
106 Ogus (2006, 312).
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– are there plausible traditional justifications (externalities, information 
failure, inadequate competition) for the measure, operating independently 
of paternalism?
– if not, and taking account of the insights of social psychology, is the reg-
ulated activity one with regard to which a significant proportion of the 
agents make decisions that are unlikely to reflect their real preferences?
– if so, are the likely costs of the regulatory measure proportionate to the 
likely benefits and/or could the same be reached at lower cost by an alter-
native instrument?.
4.4  Sunset clauses
Another procedural aspect that could be included is that behavioral policies could be 
implemented as so-called sunset laws.107 A sunset clause causes a statute to expire 
on a legally specified date.108 Sunset clauses allow the legislator to govern for a spe-
cific limited time. Sunset clauses differ from simple ex post evaluations of a policy 
or legal provision effect because, in order to be renewed, the clause must be explic-
itly re-discussed and re-approved. Law and economics scholarship has shown that 
sunset clauses are more particularly introduced in socially normative and often con-
troversial legislation such as, for example, legislation regulating gun control in the 
US or domestic surveillance.109 Temporary legislation (including a sunset clause) 
may be easier to enact also in controversial policy domains because it governs for 
a shorter period of time.110 The major advantage is that it is generally held that this 
type of legislation allows for an ex post evaluation and learning mechanism.111 If 
this evaluation shows that the rules were effective, then they can be adapted and con-
verted into permanent laws.112
Those arguments may equally apply to the case of behavioral policy-making 
which is, as one can see from the criticism in both economic and legal scholar-
ship, of a controversial nature. Moreover, scholars encourage the implementation 
of behavioral policies following experimental procedures in order to facilitate their 
impact evaluation.113 The advantage of introducing behavioral policies with a sunset 
clause is that it facilitates the experiment, while at the same time limiting its dura-
tion. An experimental implementation coupled with a sunset clause has, on the one 
hand, the advantage that the impact of the behavioral policy on the outcome of inter-
est can be estimated. On the other hand, this procedure forces the regulator to base 
107 Within the scope of this article, we discuss this suggestion separately, but obviously this could be 
included in the “constitution” as well.
108 Fagan (2011, 11), Van Gestel and Van Dijck (2011) and Bar-Siman-Tov (2015).
109 Fagan (2011, 12).
110 Fagan (2011, 14).
111 Bar-Siman-Tov (2015, 5).
112 Van Gestel and Van Dijck (2011).
113 McCrudden and King (2015, 111).
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behavioral policy-making (and the eventual extension of sunset clauses) on avail-
able evidence. Furthermore, to the extent that behavioral policy-making would have 
negative or unpredicted consequences (as held by McCrudden and King,114 who 
referred to “the dark side of nudging”), the advantage of a sunset clause is that these 
effects would be limited in time.
5  Concluding remarks
As of today, behavioral policy-making had been criticized from various perspec-
tives both in legal and in economic scholarship. Apparently, this criticism has so far 
not been impressed policy-makers, with whom behavioral policy-making remains 
increasingly popular. One reason for the lack of influence of the criticisms advanced 
is possibly that many overlook the issues and possible consequences of the prob-
lematic theoretical foundations that characterize behavioral policy-making. This is 
worrying to the extent that, while “traditional” policy-making might be imperfect, 
it is at least based on a theory (of revealed preferences) that is freedom preserving. 
Indeed, according to the theory of revealed preferences, policy-makers in designing 
interventions are bound to respect what individuals choose. Conversely, behavioral 
policy-making states that observed individuals choices can be the product of biases 
and mistakes. This entitles governments and policy-makers to decide upon the rel-
evant welfare criterion for policy-making, opening up the possibility of engaging 
in freedom-reducing activities under the justification that those activities are “detri-
mental to social welfare.” Policy-makers seem to underestimate the potential prob-
lems arising from the theoretical issues characterizing behavioral policy-making to 
the same extent that brokers using complex financial instruments a few years ago 
equally overlooked the actual degree of risk of these products, a fact that contributed 
to the financial crisis.115 Unfortunately, a theoretic alternative to the revealed prefer-
ences approach that would provide a foundation for behavioral policy-making has 
not yet been advanced. Therefore, in the absence of a well-defined theoretical frame-
work to establish a suitable welfare criterion, we suggest a pragmatic solution based 
on a definition of boundaries and clear procedures to deal with behavioral policy-
making.116 We propose the establishment of general rules constraining the powers of 
the behavioral policy-maker through “constitutional-type” guidelines for behavioral 
policy interventions.
This constitution will on the one hand provide clear criteria for situations where 
behavioral policy interventions could be warranted and where traditional interven-
tions are more proper. On the other hand, it would specify a procedure, preferably 
114 McCrudden and King (2015, 83–84).
115 Stiglitz (2011). Similarly, Nicole El Karoui, the famous French scholar from the University of Paris 
VI who elaborated the mathematical foundations on which the flawed derivative models that generated 
the 2008 financial crisis were constructed, states: “At times [mathematicians] have behaved like engi-
neers who design cars that are too fast…Perhaps the mathematicians have not explained well the risks of 
these products.” Il Sole 24 Ore, 26 ottobre 2008.
116 For example by Loewenstein and Haisley (2008, 221).
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allocating power to an independent neutral agency that verifies whether sufficient 
conditions for behavioral intervention are fulfilled. A related procedural requirement 
would be that stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process. Finally, 
behavioral policies should be accompanied with a sunset clause allowing for experi-
mentation but at the same time limiting the potentially negative consequences of a 
behavioral intervention. While awaiting solid economic theories that will form the 
basis of enlightened behavioral policy-making, we encourage to set out clear proce-
dures and safety boundaries regulating the use of this policy tool.
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